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AN ETHIC OF COMPASSION 
IN A WORLD OF TECHNIQUE* 
Roy Martinez 
Department of Philosophy 
Spelman College, Atlanta 
RÉSUMÉ : La compassion — la reconnaissance sympathisante de la détresse d'autrui jointe au 
désir de la soulager — devrait recevoir un traitement thématique plus sérieux au sein du dis-
cours moral contemporain. Nous tentons de montrer ici qu'en vertu de son souci de préserva-
tion de la dignité humaine, elle mérite d'être considérée comme l'acte éthique par excellence. 
Ce qui fait de la compassion l'essence de notre être humain. 
ABSTRACT : Compassion — the sympathetic recognition of "other's distress together with a desire 
to alleviate it" — deserves more serious thematic treatment in contemporary moral discourse. 
We attempt to show here that in virtue of its concern for the preservation of human dignity, it 
qualifies as the primary ethical act. This mak°s compassion the essence of our human being. 
T he distinctive feature or defining characteristic of an ethical act is "to consider its effect on persons."1 If this is indeed the case, then compassion — the sym-
pathetic recognition "of others' distress together with a desire to alleviate it" — de-
serves more serious thematic treatment in contemporary moral discourse.2 In what 
follows, I shall try to show that compassion, in virtue of its concern for the preserva-
tion of human dignity, qualifies it as the primary ethical act. This makes compassion 
the essence of our human being. For compassion is reason with a human face. Com-
passion, in other words, is sympathetic rationality. 
My inspiration for this project derives from the modern and postmodern periods : 
from Descartes on indifference (and generosity), Kant on Schadenfreude, and Hume 
on malice ; and Foucault and Lyotard on torture and terror respectively. In an age 
such as ours, where routine violence threatens to cover up the sanctity of life, these 
five forms of evil have succeeded in insinuating themselves into our scheme of con-
cepts, settling there with the snugness of familiarity, and operating insidiously in the 
ordinary course of life. By way of strategy, I'll proceed by highlighting these evils 
* For their helpful comments, and for offering encouragement and inspiration during the preparation of this 
study, I am grateful to my students in Honors Philosophy Seminar (Spring, 1995). 
1. Richard M. FOX, Joseph P. DEMARCO, Moral Reasoning : A Philosophic Approach to Applied Ethics, 
Orlando, FL, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1990, p. 5. 
2. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary. 
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with the intention that in doing so, the countervailing urgency of compassion will be 
more acutely felt. 
Compassion, we say, recognizes the other's distress and in the same breath is 
moved by the desire to alleviate it. It is common knowledge, however, that one can 
recognize another's misfortune but remain indifferent to it, or can, as in the case of 
Schadenfreude, obtain enjoyment from it. With respect to indifference, as Descartes 
observes, "it is always open to us to hold back from pursuing a clearly known good, 
or from admitting a clearly perceived truth, provided we consider it a good thing to 
demonstrate the freedom of our will by so doing."3 We need to question this "holding 
back," this refusal (for that is how the freedom of the will is being exercised here). 
For implied in Descartes's remark is that indifference does not mean an absence of 
feeling or a lack of reaction. Rather, indifference is voluntary : it is "the state of the 
will when it is not impelled one way rather than another by any perception of truth or 
goodness."4 Although the aspect of indifference to which Descartes refers is primar-
ily concerned with the freedom of the will as a topic of dispute with his contempo-
raries, "indifference" in this regard pertains to our discussion precisely because it in-
volves the exercise of freedom. Hence, while by this formal characterization 
Descartes implies that although in the state of indifference the will is not moved by 
any external force or pressure — religious, moral, psychological, or whatever — it 
nonetheless deliberates and acts. In the specific context of our discussion, however, 
the will, when its application extends to the social order, directly affects others in an 
adverse fashion. In other words, in choosing to ignore the other, indifference aggra-
vates her affliction. Let us explain. 
If we agree with Kant that "every man has a rightful claim of respect from his 
fellow men, and he is also bound to show respect to every other man in return," then 
it can be shown how contempt is inscribed in the central nerve of indifference. Re-
spect is the acknowledgment of the dignity of another human being as such, where 
dignity means "a worth which has no price."5 For this reason, indifference can be 
considered "the most effective strategy possible for denying a disliked or out-of-favor 
opponent any role in your surreality, not even giving him or her the recognition of 
contempt" (Solomon). But let us be more precise. Indifference becomes contempt 
when there is mutual recognition that the intention of the one is to convey an impres-
sion of insignificance, nay, of being nothing, in the other. In other words, the content 
of the message is that the person is "too insignificant to be hated, even too insignifi-
cant to be despised or treated as subhuman or human ; rather, nothing at all." Hence, 
when we turn our backs on those in misery, those who expect attention, assistance, or 
relief from us, we are in fact telling them that they do not deserve our sympathy be-
cause they have no worth. And judging something to have no worth, Kant says, is 
3. René DESCARTES, Philosophical Letters, translated and edited by Anthony Kenny, Minneapolis, Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 1981, p. 160. 
4. Ibid., p. 169. 
5. Immanuel KANT, Ethical Philosophy, translated by James W. Ellington, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1983, p. 127. 
84 
AN ETHIC OF COMPASSION IN A WORLD OF TECHNIQUE 
contempt.6 That is why a person who abets and perpetrates such evils almost always 
arouses our indignation. For "when we observe a person in misfortunes, we are af-
fected with pity and love ; but the author of that misfortune becomes the object of our 
strongest hatred, and is the more detested in proportion to the degree of our compas-
sion;'7 
Little wonder that Hume considered the passions of respect and contempt as 
contrary to each other.8 After all, is not the intention of contempt the reduction of the 
other's being to nothingness ? But human dignity defies perversion or destruction. 
Every project undertaken to deprive others of their human dignity merely reflects the 
agent's own misguided disrespect for the human in herself. And in so acting, she ren-
ders herself unworthy of the respect claimed by the human way of being. It is in this 
sense that we should understand Descartes when he asserts that "(e)very man 
is...bound to do what he can to procure the good of others, and a man who is of no 
use to anyone else is strictly worthless."9 This worthlessness is due in large measure 
to the fact that a person is maximally herself (and resembles God) when she exercises 
her free will in accordance with the evidence provided by reason. Such a reasonable 
and salutary use of free will translates into self-esteem and is accordingly termed 
"generosity." More, whoever employs freedom in this way cannot but recognize it in 
others. Thus, in Descartes, generosity, as we shall see, is contrasted with contempt. 
In the Cartesian scheme of things, "nothing lies entirely within our power except 
our thoughts," and they are in our power because of their total dependence on our 
free will. And as the Fourth Meditation teaches, it is free will that singularly ap-
proximates us to God. It follows from this that our dignity as human beings is meas-
ured by the manner in which we treat this divine resemblance. That is why Gilson 
explains that "the esteem we have for ourselves, insofar as we are considering our-
selves as making good use of this supreme control given to us over our volitions, is 
the virtue of generosity."10 And true generosity, Descartes asserts, enables a person to 
esteem herself as highly as is legitimately possible.11 Indeed, in The Passions of the 
Soul, Descartes observes that generosity consists of two factors which qualify it as 
"the key to all the other virtues and a general remedy for every disorder of the pas-
sions" (Art. 161) : (1) the person is fully aware that her freedom is her foremost pos-
session, and (2) she feels intrinsically a "firm and constant resolution to use it well" 
(Art. 153). If our most valuable asset as human beings is our personal "freedom" — 
that inestimable quality which we share with God — then we are only a quick illative 
6. KANT, Ethical Philosophy, p. 127. 
7. David HUME, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1967, 
p. 389. 
8. #/</., p. 393. 
9. René DESCARTES, "Discourse on Method," in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. I, translated by 
John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge/New York, Cambridge University Press, 
1985, p. 145. 
10. Etienne GILSON, René Descartes. Discours de la méthode. Texte et commentaire, Third edition, Paris, J. Vrin, 
1962, p. 248, quoted in René DESCARTES, The Passions of the Soul, translated by Stephen H. Voss, Indian-
apolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 1989, p. 97, n. 70. 
11. Descartes, The Passions, Art. 153, p. 104. 
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away from discerning the unreasonableness of not ascribing the same thing to other 
humans.12 For the two components of generosity mentioned above are autonomously 
generated by the soul itself ; "they do not depend on someone else" (Art. 154). And 
since this is the case, it is practically impossible for someone who is motivated by 
generosity to hold others in contempt. The reason for this is that when others do 
wrong, the generous person is "more inclined to excuse than to blame them and to 
regard such wrong-doing as due rather to lack of knowledge than to lack of a virtuous 
will" (Art. 154). Here, the generous person, ever mindful of the weakness of human 
nature, also practices humility, for which reason, as was just mentioned, she cannot 
hold others in contempt. 
The generosity we see in Descartes is lacking in Sartre. "I can choose myself as 
looking at the Other's look and can build my subjectivity upon the collapse of the 
subjectivity of the Other."13 In plain language, I see the desperate plea in the eyes of 
my fellow-sufferer, but instead of offering a sympathetic response, I coyly reject it as 
coming from one who is not worthy of my concern. That is how we should construe 
the phrase, "the collapse of the subjectivity of the Other." In refusing to get involved, 
I cast a blind eye on the other as a sufferer, and see her plaintive gesture, nay, her 
very self, as a "form which pass(es) by in the streets." I am fully aware, however, not 
only of her suffering, but also of her appeal for relief. Yet, "(t)his comprehension is 
simply what I myself determine to hide from myself." By thus attempting to extricate 
myself from those who need my sympathy, "I practice then a sort of factual solip-
sism" because "I act as if I were alone in the world."14 The problem, however, is that 
I am not alone in the world. So, by encapsulating myself in this frozen isolation — 
dismembered and degenerate — I create the illusion of being totally free, when in 
fact I merely prove myself to be the victim of the kind of self-will represented in 
Dostoevsky's world by Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment and Verhovensky in 
The Possessed. 
Now, as indifference contributes to the misery of the unfortunate other by its 
contempt and withholding of succor, Schadenfreude intensifies the pain by the very 
enjoyment of it. If we provisionally translate Schadenfreude by the term "malice," 
then "(m)alice," writes Hume, "gives us a joy in the sufferings and miseries of others, 
without any offence or injury on their part."15 Perhaps because Schadenfreude is un-
provoked, Kant refers to it as a "viciousness which is of the devil." And he goes on to 
say that this vice is devilish because it implies "a direct inclination to evil."16 
At this juncture, a distinction between Schadenfreude and "malice" is warranted. 
For the meanings of these terms can become blurred quite easily since they both em-
12. I borrow the phrase "we are only a quick illative away" from Richard A. MCCORMICK, s.j., Notes on Moral 
Theology : 1965-1980, Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1981, p. 288. 
13. Jean-Paul SARTRE, Being and Nothingness, translated by Hazel Barnes, New York, Washington Square Press, 
1966, p. 465. 
14. Ibid. 
15. HUME, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 372. 
16. Immanuel KANT, Lectures on Ethics, translated by Louis Infield, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 
1963, p. 219. 
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phasize the unprovoked aspect of this evil. In malice, a person chances upon another 
in distress, and instead of offering to help, merely takes pleasure in the situation. The 
vice here consists in the refusal to intervene sympathetically. This act of refusal as-
similates malice to indifference. Schadenfreude, on the other hand, not only discovers 
someone in distress, but actively participates in its perpetuation. Here, the pleasure 
intensifies in proportion to the duration of the misfortune. The evil consists in the 
determination to subject another to unnecessary pain in order to enjoy it. Schaden-
freude also has the peculiar trait that besides rejoicing in the suffering of others, it 
outrageously exhibits this delight to the victim. "Schadenfreude" thrives on the mu-
tual recognition that the pain of the one coincides with the pleasure of the other. As 
such, it is an indulgence in exuberant contempt. 
So far as my knowledge goes, the most notorious example of this genre of malice 
transpired on Golgotha when Jesus of Nazareth was crucified. The crowd's vitriolic 
remarks in the guise of teasing, taunting, jesting, jeering, and mocking — especially 
when he was offered rancid wine instead of water to quench his thirst — were ac-
companied by an ostensible glee which Jesus could not have failed to discern. And 
when finally Jesus died, the centurion who stood near him came to the tremendous 
realization that the object of all this wicked behavior was no other than God Himself. 
Of course, from a purely secular standpoint it can be suggested that Jesus, by chal-
lenging the status quo and attempting to subvert sacredly-held views, provoked his 
own condemnation. And since this is the case, then the consequence of finding him 
guilty was punishment by the law. Hence, we ought not to characterize the situation 
as an instance of Schadenfreude, but rather as an act of retribution. Granted ! The 
case is in our favor, however, to suppose that in the gathering that showed up to wit-
ness the public execution, there were those who, without having been adversely af-
fected by Jesus' daily transactions, nevertheless rejoiced in his suffering. Finally, it is 
even worth speculating whether the soldier would have shown some compassion had 
his realization occurred earlier. In consequence of the preceding, it should be clear 
that the term "malice" has a more extensive connotation than Schadenfreude. For 
whereas Schadenfreude is ipso facto malice, not every act of malice is an instance of 
Schadenfreude. 
But suppose someone were offended by another. Is it not natural, and even right, 
to aim at that person's harm in order to take pleasure in her misfortune ? Would not 
the injured party be entitled to some form of redress ? Shouldn't she avenge the 
wrong she has suffered ? That would be revenge. Like Schadenfreude, revenge ob-
tains enjoyment from the suffering of others, but whereas Schadenfreude is unpro-
voked, revenge aims to redirect misery to its efficient cause. Revenge is driven by a 
passionate desire to harm another person for the sole reason that one has been injured 
by that person in the first place. Unlike retribution, which is animated by a sense of 
justice or a principle of moral balance, revenge is motivated by a malicious will to 
engender suffering in another. Thus, revenge should be distinguished from the idea of 
lex talionis, whose aim is "to put a lid on the extravagance of passion by stipulating 
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that for any given harm no greater may be inflicted in return."17 Both revenge and ret-
ribution seek punishment. But are they morally justifiable acts ? "No one," writes 
Kant, "has the authorization to inflict punishment and avenge a wrong suffered from 
men except him who is also the Supreme Moral Lawgiver. And this one alone 
(namely, God) can say 'Vengeance is mine ; I will repay'."18 Yet, punishments are 
regularly and systematically meted out self-righteously by individuals and legally by 
the State apparatus. And with such cruelty ! Listen to Montaigne : "I could hardly be 
convinced, until I saw it, that there were souls so monstrous that they would commit 
murder for the mere pleasure of it ; hack and cut off other men's limbs ; sharpen their 
wits to invent unaccustomed torments and new forms of death, without enmity, with-
out profit, and for the sole purpose of enjoying the pleasing spectacle of the pitiful 
gestures and movements, the lamentable groans and cries, of a man dying in an-
guish."19 
Or, consider torture as a technique of pain and as a form of punishment. "To be 
torture," Foucault writes, "punishment [...] must produce a certain degree of pain, 
which may be measured exactly, or at least calculated, compared and hierarchized ; 
death is a torture in so far as it is not simply a withdrawal of the right to live, but is 
the occasion and the culmination of a calculated gradation of pain : from decapitation 
(which reduces all pain to a single gesture, performed in a single moment — the zero 
degree of torture), through hanging, the stake and the wheel (all of which prolong ag-
ony, to quartering, which carries pain almost to infinity ; death-torture is the art of 
maintaining life in pain [...] by achieving before life ceases 'the most exquisite ago-
nies'."20 
But back to malice per se. It is noteworthy that malice, in sanctioning unneces-
sary suffering, is itself unnecessary. This realization induced Artaxerxes, as Mon-
taigne reports, to soften the "harshness of the ancient laws of Persia by ordaining that 
the lords who had failed in their charge, instead of being whipped, as was the custom, 
should be stripped, and their clothes whipped in their place ; and that whereas they 
used to tear out their hair, they should only take away their high headgear."21 The 
suggestion here is that whatever the level of one's frustration, and whatever its 
source, it is not necessary to take it out on others. Inanimate objects can serve the 
same therapeutic purpose. Likewise, even those individuals whose occupation was 
the manufacture of death — those legally involved in carrying out capital punishment 
— seemed to have felt an inkling of sensitivity to the suffering of condemned crimi-
nals. The history of the techniques of putting them to death shows an ever-increasing 
concern with minimizing the duration and intensity of pain. For example, in 1760 a 
17. Gregory VLASTOS, Socrates : Ironist and Moral Philosopher, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1991, 
p. 182. 
18. KANT, Ethical Philosophy, p. 125. 
19. Michel DE MONTAIGNE, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, translated by Donald M. Frame, Stanford, Stan-
ford University Press, 1971, p. 315. 
20. Michel FOUCAULT, Discipline and Punish : The Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan, New York, 
Vintage Books, 1979, p. 33. 
21. MONTAIGNE, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, p. 315. 
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hanging machine that was tried in England "made use of a support, which opened 
under the feet of the condemned man, thus avoiding slow deaths."22 Then, about 
thirty years later, the guillotine was introduced in France as a perfect vehicle to re-
duce death to a "visible, but instantaneous event." For the cardinal virtue of the guil-
lotine consisted in the fact that it "takes life almost without touching the body [...]. It 
is intended to apply the law not so much to a real body capable of feeling pain as to a 
juridical subject, the possessor, among other rights, of the right to exist."23 
Even more, "(t)oday a doctor must watch over those condemned to death, right 
up to the last moment — thus juxtaposing himself as the agent of welfare, as the alle-
viator of pain, with the official whose task it is to end life...When the moment of 
execution approaches, the patients are injected with tranquilizers." Foucault snidely 
refers to this practice as "A Utopia of judicial reticence : take away life, but prevent 
the patient from feeling it ; deprive the prisoner of all rights, but do not inflict pain ; 
impose penalties free of all pain."24 Foucault's observations disclose that even power 
seems to be paradoxically endowed with the wherewithal, with enough acumen, to 
temper its blind pursuit of self-aggrandizement in order to take stock of, and repair, 
der Schaden, le mal, the damage, indeed, the havoc, that it wreaks. Or, is it rather that 
in this context, power is merely intimidated by the demonic predilection with which it 
feels itself infused ? Has power lost its grip on itself, allowing its intrepid soul to 
cower and be appalled by its nefarious deeds ? Is this a moment when power buckles 
under the strain of its imperial ambition to acquire and maintain illimitable domina-
tion ? In accordance with the tenor of our theme, we prefer to be generous and be-
lieve that the men who were legally in charge of the ritual of dying, of the practice of 
extracting the final breath of life from the condemned, were simply becoming sensi-
tized to the dignity that defines the human mode of being. It is in our interest to be-
lieve that they were moved by compassion. 
For if capital punishment is administered in the name of the law, and the law is 
not ethically inspired, then we are at a loss to dissociate such an act from simple un-
adulterated revenge. It is more plausible to think that the effort to lessen the suffering 
of those who have done wrong or committed a crime, of whatever magnitude, is gov-
erned by the principle that "evil is expiated in the ineluctable consequences that it 
carries with it,"25 which, in turn, obviates the need to aggravate the woe. This would 
then be consonant with our thesis that an act, to be qualified as ethical, must consider 
its effects on people, the aim being to prevent injuring them, or if they are already in 
distress, to alleviate their misfortune. 
Contrary to the received view, to be human is not determined by the sheer ra-
tional distinction of the species, but rather by its ability to share the suffering of oth-
ers, and its willingness to relieve them of it. Take "Auschwitz." Why do we insist 
22. FOUCAULT, Discipline and Punish, p. 12. 
23. Ibid., p. 13. 
24. Ibid., p. 11. 
25. Nicholas BERDYAEV, Dostoevsky, translated by Donald Attwater, Cleveland, The World Publishing 
Company/Meridian Books, 1957, p. 93. 
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that there is no reason for Auschwitz, that Auschwitz is too reprehensible to be asso-
ciated with reason ? Auschwitz is clearly and distinctly conceived, meticulously cal-
culated and planned, systematically executed and mellifluously justified by its agents. 
It does not suffice to dismiss Auschwitz as the product of a reason gone haywire, like 
Dostoevsky's Raskolnikov who, after deciding to kill the old pawnbroker woman be-
cause she would be better off dead than alive "learns [...] that his crime has been the 
product of a deranged rationality"26 
Reason, when devoid of compassion, and used teleologically to carry out a spe-
cific design — never suffers deprivation, never falls short of clarity of vision and 
steadfastness of purpose, never loses sight or track of the consecution of logical se-
quence or inference that constitutes it as cognition. Reason is sure of itself and knows 
what it does. Auschwitz, to our horror, knows quite well what it does. In plain idiom, 
Auschwitz spurns solidarity with the human good because Auschwitz is evil per se. 
The operative factor in Auschwitz is terror : the fear of death. "Nazism," writes Lyo-
tard, "requires nothing from what is not 'Aryan,' except for the cessation of its ap-
pearing to exist. On the other hand, it requires from every 'Aryan' (its sole addressee) 
to meet his or her obligation to the purity of his or her racial origin, in particular by 
suppressing all that is not 'Aryan'." Notice that the human good is held in contempt. 
"If there is terror in Nazism," Lyotard continues, "it is exerted internally among the 
'pure,' who are always suspected of not being pure enough. They cleanse themselves 
of suspicion by excepting themselves from all impurity through oaths, denunciations, 
pogroms, or final solutions."27 This myth of a social bond based on "excising" a pure 
race from the rest of humankind is regulated by terror, i.e., by constantly threatening 
those who are directly addressed into compliance, and by promising destruction to 
those who are excluded. "The question of the social bond, when it is put in political 
terms, has always been raised in the form of a possible interruption of the social 
bond, which is simply called 'death' in all of its forms : imprisonment, unemploy-
ment, repression, hunger, anything you want. Those are all deaths." 
The countermeasure to these "deaths" is, on our accounting, "compassion," 
which treats persons as always worthy of concern, and is quick to restore a sense of 
self-respect in those who are despised and condemned. Compassion recognizes the 
affliction of the needy, and attempts to alleviate it. For compassion is suffering 
yearning for its own expiration. 
26. William BARRETT, The Truants : Adventures Among the Intellectuals, Garden City, NY, Anchor 
Press/Doubleday, 1983, p. 174. 
27. Jean-François LYOTARD, The Différend : Phrases in Dispute, translated by Georges Van Den Abbeele, 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1988, p. 103. 
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